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Abstract—Deep learning has demonstrated state-of-the-art per-
formance for a variety of challenging computer vision tasks. On
one hand, this has enabled deep visual models to pave the way
for a plethora of critical applications like disease prognostics
and smart surveillance. On the other, deep learning has also
been found vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which calls for
new techniques to defend deep models against these attacks.
Among the attack algorithms, the black-box schemes are of
serious practical concern since they only need publicly available
knowledge of the targeted model. We carefully analyze the
inherent weakness of deep models in black-box settings where
the attacker may develop the attack using a model similar
to the targeted model. Based on our analysis, we introduce a
novel gradient regularization scheme that encourages the internal
representation of a deep model to be orthogonal to another,
even if the architectures of the two models are similar. Our
unique constraint allows a model to concomitantly endeavour for
higher accuracy while maintaining near orthogonal alignment of
gradients with respect to a reference model. Detailed empirical
study verifies that controlled misalignment of gradients under our
orthogonality objective significantly boosts a model’s robustness
against transferable black-box adversarial attacks. In comparison
to regular models, the orthogonal models are significantly more
robust to a range of lp norm bounded perturbations. We verify
the effectiveness of our technique on a variety of large-scale
models.
Index Terms—Deep learning, Adversarial examples, Adversar-
ial perturbations, Orthogonal models, Robust deep learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has enabled machines to achieve human level
performance in numerous computer vision tasks, including
image classification [1], [2], object detection [3], [4], semantic
segmentation [5], [6] and image captioning [7]. However,
despite their impressive accuracy, they are vulnerable to ad-
versarial inputs [8]. These inputs - a.k.a. adversarial examples
- are crafted by a careful manipulation of the original input
signals. The resulting adversarial examples appear natural to
humans but can completely alter the output of a deep model.
This intriguing brittleness of deep learning is currently being
actively investigated by the research community [9].
Recent years have seen numerous algorithms to compute
adversarial perturbations to inputs that can fool deep models.
These techniques can be broadly categorized into gradient-
based and gradient-free schemes [9]. Generally, the gradient-
based approaches accumulate the raw gradients of a model
w.r.t. input via iterative traversal of the model’s loss surface.
These gradients are subsequently used for targeted or non-
targeted fooling of the model. Gradient-free techniques craft
adversarial examples in a local gradient agnostic manner,
e.g., by iteratively taking feedback from model predictions
and exploiting it for model fooling [10]–[12]. It is claimed
that gradient-based techniques pose a serious threat to deep
learning [13].
Gradient-based perturbations exhibit high fooling rates un-
der white-box setting, where complete knowledge of the tar-
geted model is available. Surprisingly, these perturbations also
transfer well to models under the more pragmatic black-box
setting - where no knowledge of the target model is available.
This phenomenon enables the attackers to craft malicious
examples using a surrogate model [14]. Such insidious nature
of perturbations has raised serious concerns for the practical
deployment of deep visual models in sensitive applications
like self driving cars, medical diagnosis, face-recognition and
many others.
The pivotal role of gradients in transferable adversarial
examples naturally leads to the intuition of changing gradient
relations among different models to induce immunity against
attacks. Gradients of a model depend on its internal architec-
tural layers that govern the flow of data from input to output.
This inherent dependency of the gradients over the architecture
allows the networks of varying architectures to have somewhat
different gradients regardless of similar functional objective
[14]. However, different models with the same architecture
may still have highly correlated gradients.
Previous studies [14]–[16] demonstrate that perturbations
generated from a model maximally transfer to models with
similar architectures. We argue that the underlying similarity
of gradients facilitate this phenomena. This intuition is based
on the fundamental dependency of perturbations over model
gradients, which allows the proximity in gradients of different
models to manifest in their respective perturbations. Models
are therefore, more susceptible to perturbations that are gen-
erated from a similar architecture. In this paper, we propose
to mitigate the vulnerability of deep models to transferable
(black-box) attacks by decreasing the correlation of model
gradients.
For empirical investigation of the above arguments, we
introduce a framework that allows explicit control over model
gradients with respect to a reference model. Figure 1 illustrates
the architectural view of our scheme. It highlights the novel
gradient based constraint that allows a given model (below) to
strive for higher classification accuracy along with orthogonal
alignment of its gradients to a reference model (top). In
order to remove the disparity between the gradients due to
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Fig. 1: Schematics of our framework to train orthogonal models. On the top, a trained reference model with frozen parameters is
used for the computation of reference gradients. The model to be trained, shown at the bottom, exploits the reference gradients
to align its gradients in an orthogonal manner. Control over the direction of gradients is explicitly enabled through our novel
similarity loss objective.
architectural differences, we keep the architectures similar
and study the impact of gradient similarity over adversarial
transferability.
Our detailed analysis based on a systematic treatment of the
problem demonstrates that the robustness of models against
transferable attacks increases as the alignment between the
model gradients decreases. Our experiments establish the en-
hanced immunity of a variety of models trained over CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 datasets against transferable
attacks using our technique. The enhanced robustness is sig-
nificantly higher for the imperceptible range of perturbations.
For instance, robustness of VGG-11 (CIFAR-10) model im-
proves by 36.7% against FGSM, 67.8% against PGD, 66.8%
against I-FGSM and 55.8% against the MI-FGSM generated
perturbations with  = 0.05. The major contributions of this
work are summarized as:
• We propose a unique adversarial defense that is based on
the orthogonality of deep models w.r.t. a reference model.
• We propose a novel gradient regularization scheme that
enables a model to adjust the orientation of its gradients.
• Our systematic empirical study analyzes the correlation
between gradient similarity and adversarial transferability
for independently trained models of similar architectures.
It establishes that transferability of adversarial attacks
between the models reduces as dissimilarity between their
gradient increases.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial perturbations to inputs are primarily investi-
gated in the related literature along the lines of attacking deep
models and defending them against adversarial attacks [9].
We first discuss the key contributions along these lines and
then also describe a few recent attempts that go beyond the
adversarial perspective of input perturbations.
A. Adversarial attacks
Additive adversarial noise that can arbitrarily flip the pre-
diction of a model made its first appearance in the semi-
nal work of Szegedy et al. [8]. This work resulted in the
development of numerous techniques to attack deep visual
models. Goodfellow et al. [17] devised the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) to craft adversarial perturbations in a single
gradient ascent step over the model’s loss surface for the input.
Later, Kurakin et al. [18] advanced this scheme by introducing
a multi-step version called Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM). In
continuation, Dong et. al [15] introduced momentum variables
in the iterative traversal of loss surface and demonstrated
enhanced transferability of adversarial perturbations. Similarly,
Xie et. al [16] further improved the I-FGSM and MI-FGSM
by incorporation of random differentiable transformations like
resizing and padding to the input image. Their technique is
called Diverse Input I-FGSM (DI2-FGSM). Further instances
of the follow-up iterative algorithms are Variance-Reduced I-
FGSM (vr-IGSM) [19] and PGD [13] etc.
The above-mentioned algorithms and other recent works
[20]–[25] compute image-specific adversarial perturbations
which appear as insignificant noise to the human eye but
completely confuse the models. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [26]
first demonstrated the possibility of fooling deep models
simultaneously on a large number of images with Universal
Adversarial Perturbations. Later, Akhtar et. al [27] devised a
label-universal technique to fool a model on an entire category
of object in a targeted manner. It is now well-established
that adversarial examples computed by most techniques also
transfer well across different deep learning models. This
insidious nature of adversarial perturbations is considered as
a serious threat to practical deep learning [9] and is fueling a
very high level of research activity in this area.
1) Black-Box VS White-Box: Adversarial attacks are
broadly divided into white-box and black-box schemes [9].
This segregation is based on the amount of information
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available to the attacker to craft the perturbations.
In white-box attacks, the attacker assumes complete knowl-
edge of the targeted model including its architecture, parame-
ters values, training methods as well as the training data. The
previously discussed schemes [13], [15]–[19], [26] fall under
this category. These techniques craft the perturbations based
on the image and model specific gradients and, therefore,
require full access to the model parameters as well as its
architecture. Usually such attacks incur high fooling rates and
are further differentiated by the number of iterations, choice
of projection method and norm constraint to quantify the
perturbation magnitude [9].
In practice, intricate knowledge about the deployed model
is seldom available. Therefore, attackers treat the target model
as a black-box and utilize limited information made available
in the public domain [28]. These black-box attacks are broadly
crafted either via ‘query feedback’ or ‘transferable attack’
strategy [29]. In the query-based schemes, the attacker crafts
the perturbations by repeatedly querying the targeted model
[12] and analysing the output. On the other hand, in transfer-
able attack schemes, the attacker trains a substitute model to
emulate the targeted model and then learns perturbations for
the substitute model in a white-box setting. Such perturbations
are known to fool models that are of different architectures
and trained with different datasets [21], [28], [30]. Protection
against the transferable schemes is considerably challenging
as these attacks exploit similar generalization capability of
models [31].
B. Adversarial defenses
A variety of techniques have also been proposed to counter
the adversarial attacks [32]–[34]. These schemes aim to defend
deep models against both image-specific [34] as well as image-
agnostic perturbations [33]. Broadly, the defense schemes are
developed along four major lines.
Adversarial Training: These schemes aim to boost the robust-
ness of models by specialized augmentation in training dataset
[8], [9], [13], [17], [20], [35], [36]. Adversarial examples are
computed using the strongest available techniques and the
model undergoes training on these examples along with the
clean samples. Madry et. al [13] has systematically studied
adversarial training over a variety of models and datasets.
Recently, they publicly released robustly trained models. Inter-
estingly, beside significant performance degradation of these
models, adversarial examples can still be computed for such
models [20].
Network Modifications: Unlike adversarial training, these
techniques rework some inner aspects of a model. This gen-
erally includes introduction of new layers and enhancement
of the loss function via regularization of the gradients. For
instance, auto-encoders have received special attention among
the studies that introduce additional layers. Gu et al. [37]
and Bai et al. [38] have explored auto-encoders to mitigate
the adversarial noise in the spatial domain. Similarly, [39]
introduced a masking layer to clean adversarial noise at the
highest feature layer. Gradient regularization schemes [36],
[40]–[42] are normally based on the observation that adver-
sarial perturbations have smaller norms. Therefore, penalizing
the degree of variation of output with respect to input can
assist in detecting adversarial noise.
Network Add-ons: External networks have also explored to
aid in defense against adversarial attacks. Shen et. al [43]
re-purposed the generative adversarial networks (GANs) to
rectify the perturbed image. While Lee et. al [44] customized
those to generate adversarial examples. The generated ex-
amples along with clean samples are utilized to train the
ordinary models. The later setup has strong resemblance to
adversarial training, however, the fixed presence and larger role
of additional generator pushes this scheme in to this category
[9]. Similarly, Akhtar et al. [33] proposed a perturbation
rectifying network (PRN). This sub-network pre-processes the
input images before passing it on to the classification model.
Interestingly, training of PRN layers do not modify the weights
of the classification model and act as an effective defense
against universal adversarial perturbations.
Input Transformations: Apart from the above-mentioned
schemes, the line of work based on inherent brittleness of
adversarial patterns has recently gained momentum. These
schemes are based on the observation that perturbed inputs
do not stay adversarial in the presence of simple geometric
transformations. Among the transformation-based defenses,
Pixel deflection [45], BaRT [46] and [47] are notable. An
observation common among the mentioned studies is the
general deterioration of classification accuracy in the presence
of any defense strategy. It has been demonstrated by Carlini
et al. [48], [49] and later by Athalye et al. [50] that it is
often possible to break the adversarial defenses by stronger
adversarial attacks. Among all the defenses, adversarial train-
ing is considered to be the strongest. However, it raises
the computational budget considerably along with significant
performance degradation [13].
C. Beyond attacks and defenses
Recently, a handful of works [27], [36], [51] have demon-
strated the usefulness of perturbations beyond the simple task
of fooling. In this aspect, [51] and [36] showed that the pertur-
bations generated for adversarially robust classifiers manifest
the visual semantics of the target class. Interestingly, Santurkar
et. al [51] cast a number of computer vision applications
as adversarial attacks over the robust models. It includes
image generation, inpainting, interactive image manipulation
and image translation. However, the presented visual results
are far from acceptable. More recently, Jalwana et al. [52]
demonstrated that attacks can also be a useful tool for model
explanation. However, the authors still advocate the need of
defense techniques in adversarial settings.
D. Orthogonality In Deep Models
Recently, the principle of orthogonality has been explored
in the context of deep models. Zhang et al. [53] explored
the orthogonal projections of features to devise a capsule
projection network. Their work improves the classification
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accuracy of standard architectures over a variety of bench-
mark datasets. Similarly, [54], [55] have contributed towards
the orthogonal regularization of model parameters. Jia et.
al [55] demonstrated that besides the enhanced accuracy, these
models also have a superior natural resistance to common
perturbations like blur, weather, digitization etc. without any
explicit training. However, their work did not explore the
robustness towards the engineered adversarial noises. In the
next Section, we introduce and discuss our proposed technique
for learning orthogonal models. Unlike existing works, our
definition of orthogonality is based on the gradients rather
than the parameters.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
The prime objective of our technique is to misalign the
gradients of a given model w.r.t a reference model. First, we
introduce a metric that quantifies similarity between two mod-
els. We then reformulate the training objective to allow explicit
control over the similarity. Detailed discussion on the proposed
algorithm is presented before analyzing the qualitative aspects
of the gradient disparity on model decisions.
We define the relative orientation of gradients as a measure
of their similarity (‘δ’). Similarity between two normalized
gradients g1 and g2 is computed as the cosine of their mutual
angle. For mathematical ease, the multi-dimensional gradients
are cast as d dimensional vectors. The metric, as given in
Equation 1, has resemblance to identifying correlation between
vectors.
δi = gi1  gi2 s.t. gi1, gi2 ∈ Rd, (1)
where  denotes vector dot product.
We briefly discuss the commonly used training of ordinary
models before introducing our enhanced loss function for
orthogonal models. For a distribution D over images i ∈ Rd
with corresponding labels l ∈ [K] and selected loss function
L(θ, i, l), the goal of ordinary training is to estimate the model
parameters θ that minimize the empirical risk
℘=min
θ
E
(i,l)∼D
[L(θ, i, l)], (2)
where E[.] is the Expectation operator. In this setting, gradients
have complete liberty to follow any trajectory that leads to
minimal risk or maximum accuracy. Nevertheless, with similar
training data, architecture and hyper-parameter settings, gradi-
ents of different models induced by different initializations of
parameters still have directional similarities. This can also be
true for the models with slight architectural variations, which
generally leads to good transferability of adversarial attacks
across different models.
We handle this discrepancy by allowing control over the
gradient orientation of a model during its induction. To that
end, we enhance the commonly used training objective with
the help of the similarity metric defined in Equation 1. For
a given reference model trained over the distribution D, we
train a misaligned model with parameters θ∗ by minimizing
the empirical risk mentioned below
℘∗=min
θ∗
E
(i,l)∼D
[L(θ∗, i, l) + γδi], (3)
where the hyper-parameter ‘γ’ enables explicit control over
the gradient orientation during minimization. As the value of
this parameter increases, the gradients tend towards becoming
orthogonal to those of the reference model with minimal loss
of accuracy.
Before a detailed discussion of the proposed algorithm,
we briefly compare it with the closest available scheme of
Kariyappa et. al [56]. Similar to our work, they explored the
role of gradient disparity in promoting adversarial robustness.
However, their algorithm modifies the model gradients with
strict adherence to linear dependency of the gradients. This
contrasts with the central theoretical argument of our method
i.e., the linear independence of gradients. Moreover, their
formulation is particularly tailored to the robustness of model
ensembles that requires the specific modification of all the non-
linearities that are present in the models. Our novel scheme
improves the adversarial robustness of an individual model
via novel orthogonal gradient regularization without the need
of any architectural changes. The details of our scheme are
presented next.
Algorithm 1 Orthogonal Model Training
Input: Classifier M, reference classifier K, training samples
D, validation samples D, mini-batch size b, orthogonal
parameter γ, loss-function L
Output: M.
1: Initialize g1, g2 to 0 ∈ Rb×d and ℘∗ = δ = 0, M
parameters (θ∗) randomly, epoch = 1, Acct = Acct−1 = 0
2: while Acct > Acct−1 do
3: while i, l ∼ D do
4: g1 =
∇iL(K(i),l)
||∇iL(K(i),l)||2
5: g2 =
L(M(i),l)
||L(M(i),l)||2
6: δ = E[g1  g2]
7: ℘∗ = E[L(M(i), l)] + λδ
8: θ∗ ← Gradient descent on ℘∗
9: end while
10: epoch = epoch + 1
11: if epoch % 20 = 0 then
12: Acct−1 = Acct
13: Acct ← Find Accuracy on D
14: end if
15: end while
16: return
Our procedure to induce misalignment in model gradients
is summarized in Algorithm 1. The algorithm solves the opti-
mization problem in Equation 3 with a guided gradient descent
strategy. Mini-batches of the training samples are employed for
a multi-step traversal of the enhanced loss surface. Iterative
stepping in the direction of decreasing ‘℘∗’ with gradient
descent allows the model to gain classification accuracy along
with orthogonal alignment of its gradients w.r.t. the reference
model. Below we describe the procedure in detail, following
the sequence in Algorithm 1.
We train an orthogonal model M (w.r.t. reference classifier
K), expecting the inputs mentioned in Algorithm 1. Briefly
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ignoring the initialization on line 1 and criterion on line 2,
the algorithm first samples a mini-batch of size ‘b’. On
line 4-5, gradients of classification loss function w.r.t samples
of mini-batch are calculated for the training and reference
models. The gradients are cast as Rd vectors and normalized
by their l2 norms which not only helps in confining their
dynamic range to the meaningful interval [0,1], but also allows
direct similarity computation under Equation 1. Given the
normalized gradients, we estimate the similarity ‘δ’ as mean of
the gradient dot products as given on line 6, where E[.] is the
Expectation operator. We scale ‘δ’ by a hyper-parameter ‘λ’
and update the general classification loss on line 7. This hyper-
parameter enables explicit control over the degree of gradient
misalignment. For λ = 0, the algorithm converges to usual
training of deep model, ignorant of any gradient alignment. For
higher values (λ > 30), the model becomes nearly orthogonal
to the reference model.
Finally, the optimization algorithm is deployed for updating
the weights of model parameters with respect to the gradient
of our enhanced loss function. The choice of optimization
algorithm is not restricted in any manner, however, for a fair
evaluation, we employ the same optimization algorithm as
used in the training of our reference models. The algorithm
continues to improve the validation accuracy using the training
data. Due to the stochastic nature of deep models, we monitor
the accuracy of the model after every 20 epochs, as indicated
on line 11-13. This is a purely empirical strategy to automate
the procedure and can be replaced by manual monitoring.
In general, defenses against adversarial attacks are well
known to reduce the performance of the original model [8],
[9], [13], [17], [20], [35], [36], [36]–[42]. Hence, before we
provide the actual quantitative results in Section IV, we find it
necessary to discuss the intuition behind the attractiveness of
our proposal of employing model orthogonality as a defense.
Below, we give a simplified explanation that reveals how two
models can still have very similar classification performance,
despite their gradients beings orthogonal.
Deep classification models can be viewed as stack of non-
linear transformation layers where each internal layer sequen-
tially transforms its input before feeding it to the next layer.
Consequently, the model as a whole is able to project an input
to the output - class label in the case of classifiers. For an
input image i ∈ Rd, the output of a deep model, say i′ can be
expressed as:
i′ = TN (TN−1(TN−2(. . . T2(T1(i))))), (4)
where ‘N ’ is the number of layers. Our argument is that
despite large differences between the intermediate projections
by the internal layers of two misaligned models, both models
can still achieve similar classification objective. Thereby, en-
abling both models to preserve the same desired classification
accuracy.
We provide an intuitive explanation of this insight by
considering two simple linear models composed of four trans-
formation layers (T1 . . . T4). For the ease of understanding, we
restrict the input and transformation spaces to 3 dimensions. In
Fig. 2, we illustrate the transformations by the internal layers
of the models by arrows of different colors. It can be observed
Fig. 2: Two set of dissimilar transformations shown in blue
and orange, are applied to a set of points. Each transformation
is represented by Tx. Despite being pair-wise orthogonal the
transformations eventually project the input points to the same
output.
that despite orthogonality between each pair of corresponding
transformations, the input points are eventually mapped to the
same output by both sets of transformations (i.e. models). In
theory, this identifies the possibility of achieving the exact
same performance by two models despite orthogonality be-
tween their internal layers.
In the above discussion we consider the simple case of 3
dimensional space with linear systems. For our argument, this
is actually a more constrained setup as compared to higher
dimensional spaces that also allow non-linear systems. In
that setting, the flexibility of non-linearity and inherent low
correlation between random vectors provide a more conducive
setup for our argument to hold. In high dimensional vector
spaces, a slight variation in the components of a vector can
lead to a drastic change in its orientation. In fact, in such
spaces the probability of random vectors to be correlated
approaches to zero as the dimensions become very large [57].
We refer interested readers to Gorban et. al [57] for more
details regarding this phenomenon. Here, we capitalize on
this phenomenon - which is commonly seen as a curse of
dimensionality - constructively.
Expanding on the implications of our argument, misaligned
gradients naturally raise concerns about differences in the
internal reasoning of the models. With sheer volume of pa-
rameters and variety of non-linear layers, the direct analysis
of causality between input and output of deep models is not
possible. Hence, we analyze this reasoning for ordinary and
orthogonal models via a popular explanatory algorithm called
GradCAM [58]. This technique exploits the internal represen-
tation of a model to reliably localize the region of interest
in the input image for the model [59]. In the presence of
dissimilar gradients, one may anticipate a significant difference
between these regions for ordinary and orthogonal models,
given the same input.
We show representative results of Grad-CAM for different
VGG-16 models with varying degree of orthogonality in
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Fig. 3: Localization of salient regions of input images by Grad-
CAM [58]. λ = 0 indicates the reference VGG-16 model and
larger ‘λ’ values identify models with proportionally dissimilar
gradients w.r.t. the reference VGG-16. For the randomly
chosen images, all models result in correct predictions and
also focus on similar regions to make their decision despite
large dissimilarity between their gradients.
Fig. 3. The selected images, shown in the first column, are
from random classes, and are predicted correctly by the used
models. The images with heat maps from Grad-CAM, where
the hot spots identify the region of interest for a model. Here,
λ = 0 indicates the reference VGG-16 model and larger ‘λ’
values identify models with proportionally large dissimilarity
of gradients with the reference model, as explained above.
We provide complete details of our experiments in the next
Section. Here, we highlight with Fig. 3 that despite large dis-
similarity between the gradients of models, they are generally
able to identify the same region of interest in the images.
For the top row with dog image, all three models consider
dog’s face as the most salient region. Similarly, eye and
nose are considered important by the models for the middle
row with shark image. For the bird image, shown in the
last row, despite significant visual differences in the GRAD-
CAM outputs, it is clearly identifiable that the head and
some parts of the body are used by all the models for
correct classification. These images ascertain that despite large
dissimilarities between the gradients of different models (with
the same architecture), they are still able to perform similar
internal reasoning regarding the semantics of the inputs to
perform correct classification. Hence, besides the potential to
achieve the desired high accuracy of the reference model,
orthogonal models are also able to preserve the intuitive
internal reasoning of the models. The proposed models are
able to significantly reduce the transferability of adversarial
attacks while maintaining these desirable properties. In the
next section, we focus on providing thorough empirical evi-
dence that gradient misalignment can boost immunity against
black-box adversarial attacks.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We first outline the experimental setup before detailed dis-
cussion and analysis of empirical evaluation of our technique
on different datasets.
We evaluate the robustness of gradient misaligned models
against black-box adversarial attacks. These attacks assume
that the internal gradients of target model are not available.
Therefore, perturbations are crafted using surrogate models
and transferred to the target models. Observing success of
transferred perturbations (fooling ratio) provides a fair estimate
of model immunity. We demonstrate the generalization of
our approach by including several architectures trained over
CIFAR-10 [60] and ILSVRC ImageNet 2012 dataset [61].
We consider two separate choices of source models to
craft perturbations. First we keep similar source and target
model architectures. This enables us to verify robustness
under the more challenging condition as it is known that
perturbations transfer maximally to similar architectures [14].
Later, we consider the case of varying source architecture to
validate robustness against diverse perturbations. To evaluate
our models, for each source-target model pair, we sample 1000
images from the validation sets that are correctly classified
i.e. prior baseline accuracy for models is 100%. These images
are subsequently perturbed and classified by the target model.
Hence, the bias in fooling ratio due to already misclassified
samples is completely avoided in our results.
We craft adversarial perturbations using four well-known
attack schemes, namely the single-step FGSM [17] and multi-
step PGD [13], I-FGSM [18] and MI-FGSM [15]. These
techniques generate strong transferable perturbations and are
often used to validate the robustness of deep models [13], [21].
We used their publicly available implementations in Foolbox
[62] and AdverTorch [63]. Our experiments are based on the
Pytorch framework [64] as its native dynamic graphs provide
convenience for our gradient regularization.
The most salient qualitative feature of a perturbation is its
visual footprint. Perturbed images that are easy to identify
by human visual inspection are of little practical concern.
Therefore, following the standard practice, we keep the percep-
tibility of perturbations in an acceptable range by controlling
the step size () in attack schemes. In Figure 4, we illustrate the
visual quality of distortions as  is varied. It can be observed
that perturbations become more visible with increasing . In
our evaluation, we vary this parameter from 0.5% to 8%
to demonstrate the efficacy of our scheme. Our coverage of
robustness evaluation is more comprehensive because, given
the visual perceptibility of distortions, the existing literature
generally uses 4-5% as the upper bound for perturbations [26],
[27].
A. CIFAR-10 Models
We first demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme for
the visual models trained over CIFAR-10 dataset [60] which
consists of 60,000 32×32 color images uniformly divided into
10 classes.
Low computational cost for training models on this dataset
allows us to validate our scheme on three different architec-
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 7
Fig. 4: Perceptibility of adversarial perturbations is shown for different attack schemes as we vary the hyper-parameter ‘’ in
attack schemes. Higher value of ‘’ results in more visual distortions.
tures. This includes publicly available VGG-11 [65], ResNet-
20 [66] and ResNet-32 [66]. The deliberate inclusion of
two fundamentally different architectures (VGG and ResNet)
permits us to analyze the architectural role in developing im-
munity against adversarial perturbations. Similarly, inclusion
of two variants of ResNet enable us to analyze the role of
depth for similar architecture. ResNets have a special place in
the adversarial arena as recent works have demonstrated that
skip connections facilitate the transfer of adversarial examples
[67]. Hence, we include ResNets in our evaluation.
To train our model, we follow the standard practice of
reserving 50,000 training samples and 10,000 test samples.
Multiple randomly initialized ordinary models (λ = 0) and
orthogonal models (λ = 30) were trained via our Algorithm 1.
In Table I, we report the notable statistics of these mod-
els. We provide pairs of models such that ‘Model-1’ is the
original model and ‘Model-2’ is its newly trained version.
The orthogonal version is distinguished with a superscript ‘o’.
In the table, it can be observed that when orthogonality is
not considered, two independently trained models have high
correlation in their gradients. Our orthogonality constraint
drastically reduces this correlation. It is also worth noting that
the classification accuracy of the models with orthogonality
constraint does not reduce much and stays within 5% of the
reference model accuracy. This is a considerable improvement
over the commonly adopted technique of adversarial train-
ing [50] that is known to result in 10-20% reduction in the
original accuracy.
In Figure 5, we demonstrate the impact of gradient misalign-
ment over adversarial attack transferability. In the first row of
the figure, we use VGG-11 architecture and train a ‘source
model’ that is used to craft adversarial perturbations. These
perturbations are used to attack three models with the same
VGG-11 architecture. The first is the source model itself (red).
The second is the ‘ordinary target’ model (black), induced
with different initialization of the training process. This setup
emulates the commonly encountered black-box attack if the
attacker is able to correctly guess the (standard) architecture
of the target model. The third model is the ‘orthogonal target’
model (green) that has the VGG-11 architecture, but it is
Model-1 Model-2 Similarity (δ) Val. Acc.
VGG-11 VGG-11 0.3834 ± 0.03 90.5 ± 0.03 %
VGG-11 VGG-11o 0.0070 ± 0.0004 86.2 ± 0.06 %
ResNet-20 ResNet-20 0.1338 ± 0.04 91.4 ± 0.03 %
ResNet-20 ResNet-20o 0.0018 ± 0.0003 88.0 ± 0.04 %
ResNet-32 ResNet-32 0.1507 ± 0.04 92.5 ± 0.02 %
ResNet-32 ResNet-32o 0.0031 ± 0.0003 87.0 ± 0.03 %
TABLE I: Statistics of independently trained model pairs
on CIFAR-10. For each model training, the weights were
initialized randomly with Xavier initialization [68]. Model-
1 indicates the reference model. Model-2 is the newly trained
model with the same architecture. The superscript ‘o’ indicates
orthogonal model trained with hyper-parameter λ = 30.
Orthogonality drastically reduces gradient similarity with the
reference model while maintaining the accuracy within an
acceptable range.
trained with our technique. The second and the third rows
of the figure show the same setup for ResNet-20 and ResNet-
32 architectures. Each column of the figure shows results with
different attacks, mentioned at the top of the figure. In each
plot, vertical axis reports the fooling rate, while the horizontal
axis represents the step size ‘’ as the percentage variation of
the image dynamic range to compute a perturbation.
The plots in Figure 5 clearly indicate that our orthogonal
models have generally stronger resistance against attacks com-
pared to the source and its retrained variants. The robustness
is significantly higher for VGG architecture than for the
ResNets. We conjecture that this phenomenon results from
skip-connections that are known to facilitate the tranferability
of perturbations. Nevertheless, the orthogonal ResNets do
exhibit significant immunity against PGD, I-FGSM and MI-
FGSM attacks. This demonstrates that our technique is able
to bring robustness to ResNets as well, despite their inherent
facilitation to black-box attacks. Among all the attacks, MI-
FGSM is known to generate highly transferable perturbations
[15]. However, our orthogonal training enhances the robust-
ness by 55.8% for VGG-11, 22.4% for ResNet-20 and 17.4%
for the ResNet-32 against the attacks generated with  = 0.05.
These results are relative to the ordinary retrained model.
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Fig. 5: Fooling ratio (%) shown on the vertical axis for the perturbations crafted on ordinary classifier (source in red) and
transferred to a retrained ordinary target model (black) and orthogonal target model (green). The model shown are trained on
CIFAR-10 dataset. The horizontal axes show the step size () for perturbation computation varied from 0 to 8% of the image
dynamic range.
B. ImageNet ILSVRC2012
We extend the validation of our approach to the large-
scale ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 dataset [61] which consists
of 1.2 million color images with 224 × 224 resolution and
1000 classes of daily-life objects. It is a common practice in
adversarial defense literature to perform experiments only with
CIFAR-10 and small datasets, e.g. MNIST [69]. However, for
a more comprehensive evaluation, we present results for this
large-scale dataset despite heavy computational requirements.
We prefer this because results on ImageNet are more likely
to generalize well to other models in the era of large-scale
datasets.
Recent works [70] have established a one-to-one relation-
ship between the dimensions of model inputs and adversarial
susceptibility of the models. This makes ImageNet classifiers
especially challenging to defend against adversarial perturba-
tions as compared to MNIST and even CIFAR models. While
the lower computational complexity of CIFAR-10 dataset
permits us to train numerous models from scratch, ImageNet
training of multiple models from scratch is computationally
prohibitive.
For computational reasons, we restrict our evaluation for
ImageNet to VGG-16 architecture and employ the validation
set of ImageNet for experiments. This set comprises 50,000
images. We follow the standard split of 80/20 for the training
Lambda Similarity Train. Time Validation
λ δ (Per Model) Accuracy
0 0.522 ± 0.0516 190 ± 10 mins 58.05± 2%
5 0.351 ± 0.0203 70 ± 3 hrs 57.05± 2%
30 0.012 ± 0.0091 70 ± 3 hrs 55.01± 2%
100 0.002 ± 0.0008 70 ± 3 hrs 53.17± 2%
TABLE II: Statistics of the trained models with varying
degree of similarity with baseline. The similarity is explicitly
controlled with the hyper-parameter λ. First row captures
results for different initializations of the baseline. For λ > 0,
similarity is always evaluated with respect to the baseline
model. Results are for ImageNet validation set using VGG-
16 architecture.
and testing our models. Ordinary models, i.e. base-line, are
prepared by fine tuning the ImageNet pretrained models avail-
able in Pytorch [64]. Fine tuning is performed by following
the standard procedure of re-initialization and training of the
last fully connected layers. The initial layers are known to
capture the common shared concepts and relearning the last
few layers suffices the model to capture the underlying high
level features of the new distribution.
We use the baseline model as the reference model and train
numerous other models by varying the hyper-parameter ‘λ’
in Algorithm 1. Each experiment is repeated five times for
which the important statistics are summarized in Table II.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 9
Fig. 6: Fooling ratio (%) shown on the vertical axis for the perturbations crafted on ordinary classifier (source in red) and
transferred to orthogonal model (green). The models shown are trained on ImageNet dataset. The horizontal axis show the
step size (), and is varied from 0 to 8% of images dynamic range.
Here, the similarity of models for each ‘λ’ is w.r.t. the baseline
model. It can be observed that in simple retraining i.e. λ = 0,
strong correlation exists among the gradients. As ‘λ’ increases
to 100, the correlation almost vanishes. It is worth noting
that similar to CIFAR-10 models, the standard classification
accuracy suffers slightly and at the near orthogonal alignment
it stays within 5% of the original model’s accuracy. We
have included the training time of the models to show the
computational complexity. Generally it takes 3 days to train an
orthogonal model on ImageNet validation set using NVIDIA
Titan V GPU with 12GB RAM.
In Figure 6, we illustrate the role of dissimilarity in boosting
model robustness against transferable attacks. Perturbations
are crafted on source model, shown in red, and then evaluated
on orthogonal model, represented in green. Each column
presents the results for a particular attack type and each
row presents the results for different correlations between the
models as controlled by ‘λ’ value. The vertical axes reports
the fooling rate of the classifiers and horizontal axes represents
the step size ‘’ as percentage of the original dynamic image
range. It can be observed that for each attack type (column),
as we increase the misalignment of gradients (from top to
bottom row) the robustness of orthogonal model increases.
Overall, orthogonal models show robustness to all types of
attacks. However, maximal resistance is observed for PGD
which is considered to be the strongest iterative attack [13].
The orthogonal model increases the robustness by 67% for the
PGD attacks generated with  = 0.05.
C. Attacks from Other Models
The above results clearly establish the efficacy of our
scheme against perturbations generated from similar architec-
tures. We further demonstrate that our scheme enhances the
resulting orthogonal model robustness to perturbations crafted
from dissimilar architectures - a more realistic setting for
black-box attacks.
In Fig. 7, we show how attacks computed from different
source model transfer to our orthogonal VGG-16 model. Each
row of the figure shows the fooling results of our orthogonal
target for perturbations crafted by the architecture mentioned
on the left. Each column shows the results for a single
attack scheme as indicated on the top. The plot axes follow
our conventions from the previous figure. The red curve
represents the fooling ratio on source model and the green
curve represents the same for orthogonal VGG-16 model. For
clear benchmarking, fooling ratio for the ordinary VGG-16
model (not made orthogonal) is included as black curves.
As can be seen, we use three diverse architectures to
craft the perturbations, including ResNet-34 [71], DenseNet-
161 [72] and SqueezeNet [73]. We used the pretrained models
of these architectures available in Pytorch [64]. In Fig. 7,
the graphs illustrate superior robustness of our orthogonal
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Fig. 7: Fooling ratio (%) is shown on the vertical axis for the perturbations crafted on ordinary classifier (source in red) and
transferred to ordinary VGG-16 model (black) and orthogonal VGG-16 model (green). The horizontal axis show the step size
(), and is varied from 0 to 8% of images dynamic range. Each row reports the results of perturbations crafted on a pretrained
ImageNet model as shown in blue font on the left hand side.
model in comparison to the ordinary one. It can be observed
that the green curve reports lower fooling ratio by staying
reasonably below the black curve for all combinations of attack
schemes and source models. These results support that con-
trolled misalignment of model gradients can boost immunity of
models against adversarial perturbations especially in a black-
box setting when the target model architecture is unknown.
D. Comparison with Other Techniques
In the previous discussion, we illustrated the empirical
results of our proposed defense strategy against different
adversarial attacks. In this Section, we extend the results by
a detailed comparison of our technique with related defense
algorithms that are available in the literature.
We compare our technique with four other schemes, in-
cluding JPEG compression [47], Total Variance minimization
[74], Bit Squeezing [75] and Bilateral Filtering [76]. We
comprehensively evaluate existing defense strategies by using
different settings of their hyperparameters in the ranges that
are commonly used. Therefore, the results are reported for
four different variants of each method, making our compar-
ison considerably thorough. We refer to the original works
for details on the significance of hyperparameters. In JPEG
compression, we sweep the ‘quality’ hyper-parameter between
80% and 95%, similarly ‘weights’ are changed from 3 to 9 for
the TVM and for bilateral filters the ‘window size’ is varied
between 3 and 9. For bit Squeezing defenses the ‘depth’ is
selected between 1 and 4.
In Table III, we compare the performance of defense algo-
rithms for the models trained over ImageNet and CIFAR10
as discussed in Table I and II. The results are shown for
1000 randomly sampled images from the validation dataset,
such that the clean version of these images are correctly
classified by the standard as well as the orthogonal model.
The architecture under attack/defense is highlighted in the first
column of Table III. Perturbations are computed for the source
model via four different attack schemes for 1 = 0.03 and
2 = 0.05. The last four columns report the fooling ratios in
order 1/2. The choice of  values are based on the literature,
such that a higher value is usually perceptible [20]. The raw
fooling accuracy (no defense) is shown in the first row for each
model. These perturbations are then defended via different
schemes and the results are reported in the subsequent rows.
The best results for each attack type and model are indicated
in bold.
The results in Table III validate the superior performance
of our technique against others by a significant margin for
all the attacks. Only in the case of FGSM attacks against
ResNet20, our algorithm has shown inferior performance. This
phenomena is inline with the earlier discussed performance
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 11
Attacks
Models Defense Clean SamplesFooling ratio
FGSM
Fooling ratio
PGD
Fooling ratio
I-FGSM
Fooling ratio
MI-FGSM
Fooling ratio
No defense 0 73.3 / 78.6 89.8 / 93.2 92.4 / 93.5 90.1 / 90.6
JPEG-Quality=95 0.8 70.2 / 77.1 88.4 / 93.0 91.3 / 93.5 90.0 / 90.5
JPEG-Quality=90 1.1 67.8 / 76.3 86.2 / 92.9 89.8 / 93.3 89.7 / 90.5
JPEG-Quality=85 1.6 65.3 / 75.0 83.5 / 92.5 86.5 / 92.6 87.5 / 90.5
JPEG-Quality=80 1.9 62.0 / 73.4 79.3 / 91.6 81.5 / 91.8 84.9 / 90.5
TVM-Weight=3 1.3 49.0 / 66.8 51.4 / 81.9 51.7 / 80.8 87.5 / 90.4
TVM-Weight=5 2.7 65.4 / 77.3 74.9 / 90.2 75.9 / 89.9 82.1 / 90.4
TVM-Weight=7 3.9 60.6 / 74.7 66.8 / 87.0 65.4 / 83.4 76.2 / 89.0
TVM-Weight=9 5.6 56.5 / 72.2 59.2 / 82.0 56.9 / 77.0 68.6 / 86.3
Bit Reduction - Depth=1 43.9 62.3 / 68.2 61.2 / 69.9 62.0 / 69.6 64.1 / 73.0
Bit Reduction - Depth=2 15.0 61.5 / 69.9 69.3 / 87.4 73.5 / 87.3 77.9 / 89.2
Bit Reduction - Depth=3 1.6 69.0 / 76.6 86.5 / 92.9 90.1 / 93.2 89.3 / 90.5
Bit Reduction - Depth=4 0.3 72.8 / 77.9 89.3 / 93.1 92.3 / 93.5 90.1 / 90.6
Bilateral Filtering - Window=3 14.5 51.7 / 65.5 57.1 / 82.0 55.5 / 75.0 64.9 / 85.8
Bilateral Filtering - Window=5 17.2 48.8 / 62.1 47.6 / 67.8 45.6 / 60.4 53.1 / 78.2
Bilateral Filtering - Window=7 13.2 47.9 / 61.9 45.3 / 66.8 43.6 / 58.7 52.5 / 77.1
Bilateral Filtering - Window=9 13.6 46.7 / 60.8 44.3 / 63.7 41.7 / 57.0 49.6 / 74.8
VGG-11
(CIFAR-10)
Orthogonal Learning (ours) 0 14.3 / 31.7 8.6 / 22.0 8.0 / 21.3 13.8 / 34.1
No defense 0 78.7 / 81.3 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
JPEG-Quality=95 2.2 74.8 / 79.9 100 / 100 100 / 100 100 / 100
JPEG-Quality=90 3.7 71.1 / 77.6 98.2 / 100 97.1 / 99.5 99.8 / 100
JPEG-Quality=85 6.2 64.9 / 77.3 82.7 / 98.1 85.3 / 97.5 95.7 / 99.8
JPEG-Quality=80 9.1 57.2 / 75.7 63.4 / 89.3 68.1 / 93.8 82.1 / 98.6
TVM-Weight=3 1.1 40.1 / 60.0 51.0 / 79.9 52.0 / 83.8 99.9 / 100
TVM-Weight=5 4.4 74.4 / 78.9 93.4 / 97.8 89.9 / 97.8 98.4 / 99.9
TVM-Weight=7 5.4 71.0 / 76.7 86.2 / 92.6 79.8 / 90.5 95.3 / 99.7
TVM-Weight=9 7.6 66.2 / 74.0 78.6 / 87.3 68.3 / 82.9 91.1 / 98.8
Bit Reduction - Depth=1 71.8 75.3 / 78.6 74.2 / 76.9 75.9 / 77.4 75.8 / 79.8
Bit Reduction - Depth=2 42.5 63.1 / 73.1 68.3 / 80.8 71.4 / 87.4 79.4 / 94.5
Bit Reduction - Depth=3 12.8 71.0 / 78.3 96.0 / 99.9 98.5 / 99.8 99.5 / 99.9
Bit Reduction - Depth=4 3.6 77.2 / 81.3 99.9 / 100 99.9 / 100 100 / 100
Bilateral Filtering - Window=3 17.8 65.9 / 76.7 85.4 / 95.5 82.2 / 93.6 94.4 / 99.5
Bilateral Filtering - Window=5 29.5 59.7 / 70.4 62.8 / 72.8 62.5 / 78.1 74.7 / 89.0
Bilateral Filtering - Window=7 36.2 63.6 / 71.1 69.2 / 74.0 67.6 / 78.8 76.2 / 90.7
Bilateral Filtering - Window=9 37.1 63.6 / 71.5 68.1 / 74.3 67.3 / 76.1 76.8 / 88.1
ResNet20
(CIFAR-10)
Orthogonal Learning (ours) 0 52.0 / 74.0 47.7 / 69.3 47.5 / 73.4 54.4 / 76.8
No defense 0 93.0 / 93.1 97.9 / 98.6 98.1 / 99.3 97.3 / 97.7
JPEG-Quality=95 2.3 92.6 / 92.7 97.9 / 98.6 98.1 / 99.3 97.3 / 97.7
JPEG-Quality=90 6.2 91.9 / 92.1 97.9 / 98.6 98.1 / 99.3 97.3 / 97.7
JPEG-Quality=85 10.0 91.7 / 91.5 97.9 / 98.6 98.0 / 99.3 97.3 / 97.7
JPEG-Quality=80 14.1 90.5 / 90.8 96.6 / 98.5 97.3 / 99.1 97.3 / 97.7
TVM-Weight=3 9.6 93.4 / 93.1 97.3 / 98.6 98.1 / 99.3 97.3 / 97.7
TVM-Weight=5 14.9 93.1 / 93.3 95.7 / 97.9 95.8 / 99.3 97.3 / 97.7
TVM-Weight=7 22.2 93.0 / 93.5 92.6 / 97.2 92.8 / 98.3 96.9 / 97.7
TVM-Weight=9 27.5 92.8 / 92.9 88.7 / 95.4 87.9 / 96.1 96.3 / 97.7
Bit Reduction - Depth=1 95.2 96.4 / 96.8 95.9 / 96.3 96.1 / 97.4 96.6 / 96.4
Bit Reduction - Depth=2 84.6 93.6 / 94.8 90.8 / 93.6 93.2 / 97.0 94.4 / 97.5
Bit Reduction - Depth=3 40.6 90.7 / 91.8 96.4 / 98.3 97.8 / 99.3 97.3 / 97.7
Bit Reduction - Depth=4 10.8 92.4 / 92.9 97.9 / 98.6 98.1 / 99.3 97.3 / 97.7
Bilateral Filtering - Window=3 18.1 90.1 / 90.9 97.6 / 98.1 96.3 / 98.7 97.2 / 97.7
Bilateral Filtering - Window=5 22.3 87.8 / 90.3 94.5 / 97.5 89.1 / 96.7 96.4 / 97.6
Bilateral Filtering - Window=7 19.3 87.7 / 90.1 96.0 / 97.7 90.8 / 97.0 96.5 / 97.6
Bilateral Filtering - Window=9 18.9 86.9 / 89.5 95.2 / 97.4 89.8 / 96.2 96.4 / 97.6
VGG-16
(ImageNet)
Orthogonal Learning (ours) 0 37.2 / 61.8 14.0 / 30.8 19.4 / 47.8 32.3 / 61.4
TABLE III: Comparison of fooling ratio (%) of the proposed orthogonal learning with other defense schemes i.e., JPEG
compression, Total Variation Minimization (TVM), Bit Depth Reduction (BR), Bilateral Filtering (BR). Different variants of
defense schemes are generated by controlling the hyper-parameter as indicated in the second column. In the last four columns,
the results are shown for the attacks generated for 1 = 0.03 and 2 = 0.05 in the order 1/2 . The best results (smaller
values) for each model and attack scheme are indicated in bold fonts.
of ResNet-20 model against the FGSM attacks in Figure
5. Besides the improvement in adversarial robustness, it is
important to notice the relative clean sample accuracy of
the defense strategies. All other techniques suffer from a
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noticeable drop in the clean samples accuracy that limits the
scope of their practical application. Our method maintains a
zero fooling rate on clean samples for all models.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduced a model-agnostic gradient regularization
scheme that allows to manifest orthogonal variants of a model.
These orthogonal versions exhibit enhanced resistance to ad-
versarial perturbations against black-box attacks in scenarios
where the attacker is even able to guess the architecture of
the target model. In such scenario the different architectures
trained over CIFAR-10 show a minimum enhancement of
18.5% against PGD, 9.1% against I-FGSM and 17.4% against
the MI-FGSM attacks for  = 0.05. Importantly, our regular-
ization only results in a small degradation in the performance
of the original models. This is in contrast to the conventional
techniques for making the models robust to adversarial attacks,
which generally result in significant loss of the original model
accuracy. We presented our results for small-scale as well as
large-scale datasets to establish the proposed technique. The
achieved results highlight the potential of our scheme against
the strongest available attacks.
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